An On-Demand Defense Scheme Against DNS Cache Poisoning Attacks

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.4108/eai.15-5-2018.154771

Keywords:

NS Security Extensions, DNS cache poisoning, model checking, query load, success rate

Abstract

The threats of caching poisoning attacks largely stimulate the deployment of DNSSEC. Being a strong but demanding cryptographical defense, DNSSEC has its universal adoption predicted to go through a lengthy transition. Thus the DNSSEC practitioners call for a secure yet lightweight solution to speed up DNSSEC deployment while offering an acceptable DNSSEC-like defense. This paper proposes a new On-Demand Defense (ODD) scheme against cache poisoning attacks, still using but lightly using DNSSEC. In the solution, DNS operates in DNSSEC-oblivious mode unless a potential attack is detected and triggers a switch to DNSSEC-aware mode. The modeling checking results demonstrate that only a small DNSSEC query load is needed by the ODD scheme to ensure a small enough cache poisoning success rate.

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Published

15-05-2018

How to Cite

Wang, Z. ., Yu, S. ., & Rose, S. . (2018). An On-Demand Defense Scheme Against DNS Cache Poisoning Attacks. EAI Endorsed Transactions on Security and Safety, 4(14), e3. https://doi.org/10.4108/eai.15-5-2018.154771